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Abstract—This paper presents a new electronic voting sys-
tem, called Direct Recording Electronic with Integrity (DRE-i).
The DRE is a widely deployed voting system that commonly
uses touch-screen technology to directly record votes. However,
a lack of tallying integrity is widely considered the most
contentious problem with the DRE system. In this work, we
take a broad interpretation of the DRE: which includes not
only touch-screen machines, as deployed at polling stations,
but also remote voting systems conducted over the Internet or
mobile phones. In all cases, the system records votes directly.
The DRE-i protocol is generic for both on-site and remote
voting and provides a drop-in mathematical solution to ensure
tallying integrity without altering the user’s intuitive voting
experience. The auditing is voter-initiated, so every voter can
verify that the machine counts votes correctly. As we adopt
a novel technique to encrypt votes, the system is self-tallying:
that is anyone can tally votes without any tallying authority
involvement. To our best knowledge, our proposal is the first
centralized e-voting system that is self-tallying. We discuss the
strengths and weaknesses of this new design.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting system
commonly adopts touch-screen technology to record the
voter’s choice directly. The system can provide several
benefits in terms of usability, accessibility and efficiency
[18]. Voters, including the disabled and the elderly, generally
consider a touch screen interface easy-to-use [28] and the
electronic display can be conveniently customized to various
language options. In addition, DREs can effectively limit
voters to select only a specified number of candidates, hence
preventing both over- and under-voting [18].
The procedural complexity of a DRE is low. Firstly, the
voter authenticates himself at the polling station and obtains
a token (typically, a PIN slip or smart card) [24]. The
voter enters a private booth, presents the token to the DRE
machine, and starts the voting process. Figure 1 shows an
example1 of the selection choices on the touch screen. The
voter follows two basic steps to cast a vote: 1) select a
candidate; 2) confirm or cancel. If the voter opts to “confirm”
the intended vote, the vote is recorded. Otherwise, no vote
is recorded, and the screen will again prompt the voter to
select the desired candidate.
1This is the simplest example and for illustration only. The real system
may be more complex, however the basic procedure is roughly the same.
Figure 1. A touch screen based single-candidate DRE voting system
The perceived benefits of DRE had created a wave of
adoption in many countries. For example, the use of DRE
technology has expanded rapidly in the United States since
the 2000 election – from 12% in that election to 29% in
2004, to 38% in 2006 (but it quickly dropped to 32% in
2008 for reasons we will explain) [33]. This was largely
attributed to the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002,
which requires at least one voting machine in each precinct
to fully accommodate disabled voters (DREs satisfy this
requirement). Other DRE technology adopters include India,
who in the 2004 election moved to full DRE voting, and
Brazil, who started its first fully DRE election in 2002 [5].
However, potential security vulnerabilities with DREs
were publicized as a result of several studies. The anal-
ysis of the Diebold voting system carried out by Kohno
et. al. was one of the first, and highly influential [24]. The
researchers, through access to the source code of the system,
discovered serious system flaws and software vulnerabilities.
Other studies revealed similar results [16]. The alarming
level of security defects found casted wide-spread doubt
on the integrity of the tallying result. In response to the
research findings in [16], [24], many people called on the
United States government to abandon DREs completely,
and to discard e-voting in general. Several states in the
US consequently reverted to old-fashioned voting machines,
resulting in the quick decline of DRE usage from 38% in
2006 to 32% in 2008 [33].
E-voting is a new technology, and as with any new
technology, it takes time for it to develop and mature.
Rushing to embrace e-voting is just as harmful as rushing to
reject it. In this study, we first need to distinguish protocol
errors from implementation errors. Many of the reported
problems, such as buffer overflow, SQL injection etc, are
related to the latter. However, from a system point of view,
we would be more concerned with the former, because
protocol errors are more fundamental and harder to fix.
The proceeding example (see Figure 1) contains a severe
protocol error (although similar systems have been widely
deployed [24]). After the voter casts a vote, there is no
way for the voter, or others, to verify whether the vote
has been correctly counted in the final tally. The voter has
to completely trust the DRE machine. This is unacceptable
from a security point of view, because a totally trustworthy
machine does not exist.
A practical countermeasure adopted by many countries is
through government certification. But this fails to resolve the
protocol error. Whilst the certification may be necessary, it
is not sufficient in building up public confidence and trust.
Previous studies have shown that even certified machines
still contain an abundance of software defects and system
vulnerabilities [16], [24].
In this paper, we will propose a mathematical solution to
ensure tallying integrity in a DRE system, without altering
the voter’s intuitive voting experience. While the solution
primarily focuses on tallying integrity, we also present
procedural means to protect the voter’s privacy in a complete
system. Our work is based on understanding the realistic
boundaries in e-voting: what can and cannot be achieved
through cryptographic means. We believe it is crucial to
understand the exact merits and limits of e-voting before
deciding where it is applicable.
II. PAST WORK
In this section, we review past work related to electronic
voting. There are many paper-based voting protocols, such
as Prêt à Voter [7], Scantegrity [6], ThreeBallot [26] etc.
These protocols have different security properties and trade-
offs when compared with e-voting systems. It is, however,
beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate those protocols.
There are two categories of e-voting: decentralized and
centralized [12]. In the former case, the election is run by
voters themselves without involving any trusted third parties.
A decentralized e-voting protocol can provide the theoretical
best protection of the voter’s privacy: the voter does not have
to trust anyone but himself [12]. However, such protocols
are limited in terms of scalability and are only suitable
for small-scale elections [12], [21], [23]. This contrasts
with centralized e-voting, where centralized administration
ensures a greater level of robustness and is considered more
suitable for large-scale elections [28], [30].
DRE is one example of centralized e-voting. As with any
centralized system, the DRE machine becomes an attractive
target of attack and a single point of failure. If the machine
crashes during an election, it may cause great disruptions to
the election. On the other hand, due to the centralized nature,
it is feasible to focus resource on protecting the machine
from system failures.
Apart from system robustness, a key issue with a DRE
system is whether the software is trustworthy. Government
certification of the DRE is one perceived method to instill
trust [24], however, numerous studies have shown that it is
imprudent to rely on certification for establishing trust [16],
[24].
To build a trustworthy DRE system, there are two general
approaches: through trusted computing [18]–[20] or mathe-
matics [11], [28]. The first approach attempts to bootstrap
trust from the integrity of a small piece of hardware and soft-
ware, called Trusted Computing Base (TCB) [19]. However,
the existence of the TCB is sometimes called into question
[30]. For example, Scytl produces a commercial TCB-based
solution [32]. It is an external device that can be attached
to the DRE machine, permitting voters to verify votes in
real-time. Essentially, this solution shifts trusting the DRE
to trusting Scytl – voters must completely trust the software
of the Scytl device (and trust it does not collude with the
DRE) [30].
The second approach is more promising. Rivest once
suggested a famous design principle for e-voting systems:
that is “software independence” [27]. This principle states
that it does not really matter how the software is written
inside the system, by verifying the output of the software,
the voter can get assurance that the software is tallying
votes correctly. Essentially, this approach shifts from trusting
software to trusting mathematics – and mathematics is pub-
licly verifiable. “Software independence” is also the guiding
principle in our work.
There have been many cryptographic voting protocols
proposed, for example [1], [2], [9], [25], [28]. In general,
they all involve tallying authorities (also called trustees)
and employ mix-nets or threshold decryption. For example,
in the VoteBox voting system, all the votes are encrypted
by a tallying public key using ElGamal encryption [28].
The private key is shared among a number of authorities
using a secret sharing scheme. The homomorphic property
of the ElGamal encryption facilitates adding votes in the
ciphertext form. The final tally is revealed when a quorum
of authorities are reached to reconstruct the decryption key.
In a different approach, Chaum proposes to let each trustee
possess his own public key, which in turn is used to encrypt
the votes [9]. The encrypted votes are run through a series
of mix-nets for shuffling and re-encryption before they are
finally decrypted. Neff has a similar mix-net based protocol
[25].
The latest development in this line of research is the
web implementation of the Helios e-voting system [1], [2].
The Helios system is built on pre-existing cryptographic
techniques and web development tools. The system design is
basically the same as past works [9], [25], [28] – it depends
on tallying authorities, and employs mix-nets in Version 1.0
[1] and threshold decryption in Version 2.0 [2]. To some
extent, the Helios system reflects the current state of the
cryptographic research on e-voting.
The practical significance of the Helios system is shown
by a number of real-world elections. In 2009, the Université
catholique de Louvain (UCL) adopted a customized version
of Helios (v2.0) to elect its president [2]. Subsequently, the
International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR)
chose Helios 2.0 to run a trial election in 2010 [15]. Both
elections were reported a success [2], [15].
The elections demonstrated two advantages of e-voting:
precision and convenience. It is interesting to note that in
the UCL election, the leader came short of winning the
first round of the election by only 2 votes (out of a total
of about 4000 [2]); the audit of the tally led to a quick
acceptance without any recount or dispute. This level of
precision is remarkable when compared to the often tedious
and error-prone manual counting. In the IACR election,
members were asked whether to switch to electronic voting
or keep the current paper-based system. The vast majority
voted for switching to electronic voting (344 vs 32) due to
convenience of use over the traditional method of double
envelopes sent via postal mail [15].
However, practical deployments have also revealed some
(inherent) drawbacks of the Helios system. These drawbacks
are also generally applicable to other cryptographic voting
protocols [25], [28]. Although Helios is customized to be
web-based, the lessons are relevant to touch-screen based
implementations too.
In general, four drawbacks were reported. First of all,
the use of a Java plug-in was commonly seen as a major
limitation [15]. Second, due to the expensive cryptographic
computation in the browser, client performance was consid-
ered slow (especially on older computers) [31]. (The study
in [31] also shows that voters generally had no clue what
the Java plug-in in their browsers was doing.) Third, in
the IACR trial, some voters reported they could not verify
the downloaded code from the Helios server and hence
refused to accept and execute the code [15]. Fourth, as
acknowledged in the Helios paper [2], the management of
tallying authorities proved to be a real challenge in practice.
For example, the UCL election report shows that the chosen
tallying authorities were not computer experts, so they had
to rely on a small group of computer scientists to perform
most of the authorization tasks [2]. In addition, all of the
tallying authorities’ private keys were centrally backed up
by a notary public2. In principle, the notary public was able
to view all the secret votes.
Among all the above drawbacks, the fourth – i.e., the
reliance on tallying authorities – indicates the real weakness
in the practical system. This view might seem surprising to
2The central backup was decided necessary by the Helios designers in the
UCL election [2] – if some of the authorities’ USB tokens were damaged
or lost, the whole election would be aborted.
some, since the adoption of tallying authorities has become
deeply entrenched in past voting research.
Our reasoning is as follows. Firstly, we perceive the
reliance on tally authorities as a key to all other issues. As we
will demonstrate, once the need for tallying authorities is re-
moved, other problems will be resolved naturally. Secondly,
tallying authorities are difficult to implement (something
which people take for granted until the system is actually
deployed in practice [2]). Finally, there is a question on the
exact role of the tallying authorities. Are they to protect
the voters’ privacy, or tallying integrity – or both? This is
not always as clear as it should be. For example, in the
Helios system, the voter must trust the code downloaded
from the Helios server not to reveal any secret. The mere
encryption by the browser using the authorities’ public keys
does not assure voter privacy (see [17]). Indeed, the Helios
paper itself acknowledges that “Trust no one for integrity,
trust Helios for privacy.” [1]. Actually, to assure integrity,
we do not need to involve tallying authorities at all.
Within this paper we propose a voting system that is free
from all of the above issues found with Helios. Our solution
makes use of a cancellation formula that was first proposed
in [14] and [12]. Although the formula itself is not new,
applying it to centralized e-voting is. As a result, the election
is self-tallying. In the following section, we will explain in
detail how the system works and the advantages of being
self-tallying.
III. THE DRE-I PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe a cryptographic e-voting
protocol called DRE-i, where i stands for integrity. For
simplicity of discussion, we will mainly explain the protocol
in the context of touch-screen based on-site voting, and later
show its application in remote e-voting.
A. Integrity requirements
To ensure integrity, a voting protocol should fulfill the
following requirements.
1) Ballot well-formedness: The ballot must have the cor-
rect format to represent exactly one vote. For example,
in a single-candidate election, the ballot should con-
tribute either 0 or 1 to the tally. The Zero Knowledge
Proof (KZP) is a well-established technique to ensure
ballot well-formedness [10], [11].
2) Cast as intended: The recorded vote must be the
same as the one the voter intended to cast. Benaloh’s
voter-initiated auditing is a widely adopted solution
[4], which is also used in our system.
3) Counted as cast: The tally must be the same as
the sum of the recorded votes. Satisfying this crucial
requirement without tallying authorities is the main
contribution of this paper.
Additional requirements, such as coercion resistance, can
be found in [6], [22], [28]. We explain in Section IV that
our protocol also fulfills those requirements.
B. Three Stages of Voting
The DRE-i protocol consists of three stages: ballot gen-
eration, ballot casting and ballot tallying. The following
sections explain each stage in detail.
1) Ballot generation: Let G denote a finite cyclic group
of prime order q in which the Decision Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) problem is intractable [29]. Let g be a generator
in G. The parameters (G; g) are publicly agreed before the
election starts.
Let us first consider the single-candidate case. The system
generates n ballots where n is significantly larger (say 10
times more) than the total number of the eligible voters. The
extra ballots are used for auditing purposes.
For each ballot, the system computes a random public
key gxi , where xi 2R [1; q   1]. When this is done for all
the ballots, the system computes gyi =
Q
j<i g
xj=
Q
j>i g
xj
for every ballot. Here, we call gyi a restructured public
key, because it is constructed by multiplying all the random
public keys before i and dividing all the public keys after i.
Given that xi is random, yi 6= 0 holds with an exceedingly
overwhelming probability. (If yi = 0, it would be publicly
obvious that the machine is misbehaving.) In the following
theorem, we assume the machine selects xi properly at
random and keeps the values secret. In Section IV, we will
discuss the implications if the machine deviates from this
assumption.
Theorem 1: Under the Decision Diffie-Hellman assump-
tion, provided yi 6= 0, the term gxiyi is indistinguishable
from a random non-identity element in the group G.
Proof: By the protocol definition, xi 2R [1; q   1] and
yi =
P
j<i xj  
P
j>i xj . The yi is random over Zq and is
unrelated to xi. Since, yi 6= 0, we have yi 2R [1; q   1]. To
obtain a contradiction, we assume there is a polynomial-
time algorithm (an oracle) to distinguish gxiyi from a
random non-identity element in the group G. Without loss
of generality, we only discuss the case that i = 1.
Given ga, gb, gab where a; b 2R [1; q   1], the DDH as-
sumption states that gab is indistinguishable from a random
non-identity element in G (see [29]). We now show how the
assumed oracle can break this assumption. First, we do an
efficient transformation as shown in Table I. Basically, we let
gx1 = ga and gx2 = g b 
P
i>2 xi where xi 2R [1; q 1] for
i > 2. We do not need to know the values of x1 and x2. Fol-
lowing the definition of yi, we obtain y1 =  
P
i>1 xi = b.
Thus, gx1y1 = gab (the value was given). For i = 2, we can
compute gx2y2 = g( b 
P
i>2 xi)(a 
P
i>2 xi). Similarly, we
can easily compute gx3y3 until gxnyn . As shown in Table I,
the resultant new table is indistinguishable from the old one.
Since the assumed oracle can efficiently distinguish gx1y1
from random, it thus can efficiently distinguish gab from
random. This however contradicts the assumption that the
DDH problem is intractable. The same argument applies if
any gxiyi (i 6= 1) is distinguishable from random.
The “Yes”/“No” value in each ballot is encoded in the
form of as Ci = gxiyi  gvi where vi = 0 for “No” and
1 for “Yes”. Theorem 1 shows that the no-vote, gxiyi , is
indistinguishable from random. Clearly, the yes-vote, gxiyi 
g, is indistinguishable from random too. However, if both
no-vote and yes-vote are published, the correlation between
the two will make it trivially obvious which is “No” and
which is “Yes”.
In addition, the system needs to compute a 1-out-of-2
ZKP for each yes/no value. This is to ensure that the value
of the vote is indeed in the correct form of Ci = gxiyi  gvi
where vi 2 f0; 1g. In other words, the value vi can only be
one of the two: 0 and 1. We adopt the standard 1-out-of-n
ZKP technique (also known as the CDS technique) presented
in [10]. Here, we use n = 2. Details about the 1-out-of-n
Knowledge Proof can be found in [10], [11].
As shown in Table II, we define the cryptograms for the
yes/no votes as follows. The cryptogram of the no-vote con-
tains gxiyi and a 1-out-of-2 ZKP. Similarly, the cryptogram
of the yes-vote comprises gxiyi g and a corresponding 1-out-
of-2 ZKP. At the end of the ballot generation, the random
public keys are published on the bulletin board, while the
cryptograms are kept secret by the machine. After this stage,
the xi secret values will not be needed for the rest of the
protocol execution.
2) Ballot casting: While ballot generation is performed
before the election, in a controlled environment (where party
representatives can observe), ballot casting occurs at the
polling stations on the election day. The environment at the
field deployment of the DRE becomes more adverse. How-
ever, note that all the random values used in the computation
of the cryptograms have been chosen before the election and
the random public keys have been published on the public
bulletin board (see Table II). This greatly limits any room
of maneuver by a DRE once it is deployed in the field. The
ballot casting basically involves very simple operations to
print out the pre-computed cryptograms depending on the
voter’s choice, as we explain below.
As before, we assume the eligible voter has been properly
authenticated before entering the private voting booth and
that the machine does not know the real identity of the
voter. The voter presents the authentication token to the DRE
machine and sees the same “select and confirm” interface
on the touch screen (Figure 2). The ballot number i may be
incremental or randomly assigned – there is no significant
difference from the protocol’s perspective. To cast the ballot,
the voter follows the same two steps.
In step one, the voter selects a choice on the screen.
Meanwhile, the machine prints the following commitment
data on the paper: the ballot number i, the cryptogram of
the selected choice (i.e., gxiyi  gvi where vi = 0 or 1 for
gx gy gxy gx gy gxy
gx1 gy1 gx1y1 ga gb gab
gx2 gy2 gx2y2 g b 
P
i>2 xi ga 
P
i>2 xi g( b 
P
i>2 xi)(a 
P
i>2 xi)
gx3 gy3 gx3y3 ) gx3 ga b 
P
i>2 xi 
P
i>3 xi gx3(a b 
P
i>2 xi 
P
i>3 xi)
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
gxn gyn gxnyn gxn ga b xn gxn(a b xn)
Table I
TABLE TRANSFORMATION. THE VALUES OF a; b ARE RANDOM OVER [1; q   1]. IN EITHER TABLE, THE xi VALUES ARE RANDOMLY CHOSEN FROM
[1; q  1]. CLEARLY, IN THE LEFT TABLE, THE EXPONENTS OF gx ARE ALL RANDOM; IN THE RIGHT TABLE, THE EXPONENTS OF gx ARE ALL RANDOM
TOO. THE TWO TABLES ARE INDISTINGUISHABLE.
Ballot Random Restructured Cryptogram Cryptogram
No public key public key of no-vote of yes-vote
1 gx1 gy1 gx1y1 , 1-of-2 ZKP gx1y1  g, 1-of-2 ZKP
2 gx2 gy2 gx2y2 , 1-of-2 ZKP gx2y2  g, 1-of-2 ZKP
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
n gxn gyn gxnyn , 1-of-2 ZKP gxnyn  g, 1-of-2 ZKP
Table II
BALLOT GENERATION. THE TABLE, EXCEPT THE LAST TWO COLUMNS, IS PUBLISHED ON A PUBLIC BULLETIN BOARD BEFORE THE ELECTION STARTS.
Figure 2. A DRE with integrity (DRE-i) voting system . A confirmed
ballot is termed a “valid” vote while a canceled one is referred to as a
“dummy” vote.
“No”/“Yes” choice correspondingly, and a 1-out-of-2 Zero
Knowledge Proof to prove that vi is indeed one of the
two values f0; 1g). The commitment transcript is digitally
signed by the machine to prove the authenticity. The same
content, including the digital signature, will be available on
the bulletin board for public verification.
In step two, the voter either confirms or cancels the
selection. If he chooses to confirm, the system will print a
“finish” message on the paper. However, if the voter chooses
to cancel, the DRE machine will print the selected choice,
and reveal the other cryptogram onto the paper. The touch
screen will return to the “select candidate” step. A voter is
entitled to cast as many dummy votes as he wishes3, but
is allowed to cast only one valid vote. As in the previous
step, the commitment transcript is digitally signed; the same
content will also be available on the bulletin board.
3Obviously, this is bounded by n and, in practice, a reasonable limit
would be enforced.
The cancel option serves for auditing. Note that the 1-
out-of-2 ZKP ensures that the format of the “No”/”Yes”
votes is in the form of gxiyi  gvi , vi 2 f0; 1g, but it
does not guarantee the correct assignment of “0”/“1” to
“No”/“Yes”. Voter-initiated auditing addresses this (the same
auditing idea was first proposed by Benaloh [4]) and can be
performed by any voter during any stage of the election.
When all the voters have cast their votes, the system will
reveal the remaining ballots as “dummy” and publish them
on the public bulletin board (displayed as if canceled by the
voters).
The paper receipt for ballot i contains the printed data
from both steps. The voter is free to take home the receipt
and verify it against the public bulletin board that his
vote has been indeed included. The receipt does not reveal
whom the voter has voted for, therefore, preventing potential
coercion and voter-buying.
3) Ballot tallying: Tallying the ballots is a case of multi-
plying the published cryptogram Vi (for dummy votes, only
the no-value) all together (See Table III). Thus, we haveQ
i Vi =
Q
i g
xiyigvi =
Q
i g
vi = g
P
i vi . The key to the
tallying process is the fact that
P
xiyi = 0, which we refer
to as the “cancellation formula” (see Proposition 1 and also
[12], [14]). The term
P
i vi is the total number of the “yes”
votes. Since it is a relatively small number, it is feasible to
compute it by exhaustive search. However, this exhaustive
search is not entirely necessary. Since the machine records
the ballots directly, it can announce the count of “yes” votes,
, right after the election. Everyone can verify whether g
and g
P
i vi are equal. This takes only one exponentiation.
Also, everyone can count the number of dummy votes from
the bulletin board, which we denote as . Thus, the tally of
“no” votes is  = n     .
The tallying process must admit all the cast votes, in-
No Random Restructured Published Votes ZKPs
i pub key gxi pub key gyi Vi
1 gx1 gy1 Valid: gx1y1 a 1-of-2 ZKP
2 gx2 gy2 Valid: gx2y2  g a 1-of-2 ZKP
3 gx3 gy3 Dummy: gx3y3 , gx3y3  g two 1-of-2 ZKPs
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
n gxn gyn Dummy: gxnyn , gxnyn  g two 1-of-2 ZKPs
Table III
BALLOT TALLYING. THIS ENTIRE TABLE IS PUBLISHED ON THE PUBLIC BULLETIN BOARD. A VOTE CAN BE EITHER VALID OR DUMMY. BALLOT NO. 1
SHOWS AN EXAMPLE OF A VALID “NO” VOTE, AND NO. 2 SHOWS AN EXAMPLE OF A VALID “YES” VOTE. TALLYING IS TO MULTIPLY ALL THE Vi
VALUES (ONLY INCLUDING THE “NO” VOTES FOR THE DUMMY CASE).
cluding the dummy ones. Partial tallying will not lead to
any meaningful result. Essentially, the multiplication of the
ciphertexts reveals one-bit of information to the public:
whether or not the integrity of the tallying result holds.
Therefore, a single missing ballot will invalidate the integrity
check. In that case, the machine can still announce its inter-
nal count of the recorded “yes” votes. But the count is not
trustworthy, because it cannot be verified. (By comparison,
existing DRE systems do not provide any means for the
public to verify if the tally is correct.)
Proposition 1 (Cancellation formula): For the xi and yi
as defined in the protocol,
P
i xiyi = 0.
Proof: By definition yi =
P
j<i xj  
P
j>i xj , henceX
i
xiyi =
X
i
X
j<i
xixj  
X
i
X
j>i
xixj
=
XX
j<i
xixj  
XX
i<j
xixj
=
XX
j<i
xixj  
XX
j<i
xjxi
= 0:
C. Extension to multiple candidates
There are several ways to extend a single-candidate elec-
tion to multiple candidates [12]. One efficient method is
attributed to Cramer et al. [11]: suppose that we have n
votes, choose m so that m is the smallest integer such that
2m > n. Now the vote for candidate 1 is encoded as 20,
for candidate 2 as 2m, for candidate 3 as 22m, and so on.
In other words, redefine the encoding value vi within the
cryptogram definition Ci = gxiyi  gvi as:
vi =
8>>><>>>:
20 if vote for candidate 1
2m if vote for candidate 2
     
2(k 1)m if vote for candidate k
Tabulation is much as before:
Q
i g
xiyigvi = g
P
i vi .
The votes are summed and the super-increasing nature of
the encoding ensures that the total can unambiguously be
resolved into the totals for the candidates. Hence,
P
i vi =
20  c1 + 2m  c2 + : : : + 2(k 1)m  ck, where c1 to ck are
the counts of votes for the k candidates correspondingly.
As before, the machine will announce the counts of votes
right after the election. Anyone can verify the counts against
g
P
i vi , which takes a single exponentiation.
D. Voter privacy
We stress that when it comes to voter privacy, there is an
inherent limitation with the DRE – privacy is constrained
by the necessary human interaction with the machine, which
records the votes directly. A corrupted touch screen terminal
can easily learn the secret choice.
Yet voter privacy is important. One solution – as adopted
in the US [24] – is to depend on procedural means to keep
voters anonymous. For example, voting officials shall ensure:
1) the voting booth is private; 2) the DRE machine does not
know the voter’s real identity; and 3) the published ballots do
not show any linkage to the voters. These serve to decouple
the voter’s real identity from each cast ballot, and hence to
preserve the voter’s privacy.
E. Remote e-voting
We now take a broad interpretation of the DRE voting sys-
tem: which not only includes on-site touch-screen machines,
but also remote voting systems conducted via the Internet
or mobile phones. In all cases, the system records the votes
directly, although the security environments are different.
The DRE-i protocol is applicable to both on-site and
remote e-voting scenarios. The protocol remains basically
the same although the implementations are quite differ-
ent. For example, in web-based Internet voting, the DRE
machine may commit data by sending a signed email (as
opposed to printing on paper). Similarly, if a mobile phone
is used to vote, a signed Short Message Service (SMS)
may be sent. We stress that on-site and remote voting
applications have distinct voting environments, each with
an impact on security. Most notably, in a remote setting,
we will lose effective procedural and physical protections
that are available in an on-site election. Consequently, it
becomes much harder to keep voters anonymous. In an
electronic world, where transmitted messages leave traces
in the network log files, maintaining real anonymity is a
challenging research problem in itself.
The loss of physical and procedural protections also opens
up a number of new attacks – for example, a voter may be
cajoled in disclosing their vote via a “bogus” website; the
actual vote may be conducted under the duress of a coercer;
voting credentials may become an item of profitable trade
etc. Also, any independent observation of “counting valid
voters” at the polling station will no longer be possible.
Nevertheless, remote e-voting may still prove useful in
some specifically identified scenarios, where the concerns
of coercion and voter privacy are low – for example, in the
UCL [2] and IACR elections [15].
IV. DRE-I ANALYSIS
In the following sections, we perform a comprehensive
analysis of the proposed DRE-i protocol: explaining the
technical properties of the protocol, discussing protocol
implementations, highlighting practical threats concerning
deployment as well as suggesting possible mitigation strate-
gies.
Technical Properties of the Protocol: The DRE-i protocol
fulfils the three integrity requirements as described in Sec-
tion III-A. The use of the CDS technique (i.e., the 1-out-
of-n zero knowledge proof) ensures the correct format of
the ballot [10], and fulfills the first requirement. The second
requirement is satisfied by the auditing function as described
in [4]. Any voter can be an auditor by simply pressing
the “cancel” button. The third requirement is fulfilled by
the use of the “cancellation forumla” [14] together with
homomorphic encryption [12]. This permits anyone to easily
verify the tally, based on the encrypted data displayed on
the public bulletin board, without relying on any tallying
authority.
In addition, the protocol protects the secrecy of the valid
votes. The published value for a valid vote, gxiyi  gvi for
vi = 0 or 1, is indistinguishable from random (see Theorem
1) and the associated 1-out-of-2 ZKP reveals nothing more
than the statement: vi is either 0 or 1 [10]. A dummy
vote (where both cryptograms are revealed) requires no
secrecy since it does not add to the tally. With any DRE
system, the machine naturally learns the value of each vote
(i.e., “Yes” or “No” for a single-candidate election). Our
protocol cannot prevent a corrupted machine leaking the
secret values. However, there are non-technical, procedural
measures, to further protect a voter’s privacy.
The paper receipt in our protocol is coercion free. As
detailed earlier, if the voter chooses to confirm the vote,
the receipt does not leak any information about the choice
made. This prevents potential coercion and vote-buying. If,
however, the voter opts to cancel the vote, the receipt will
reveal the selected choice, but the vote is declared dummy.
A dummy vote is useless to the coercer.
Estimating the Computation Cost: We begin by examin-
ing ballot generation. This stage involves computationally
intensive operations. For a typical scenario, let us assume
n = 105 (which is 10 thousand voters at a polling station
times a safety factor of 10 for auditing). Also, we assume
a typical cyclic group setting where p is 1024-bit and q is
160-bit.
As shown in Table II, we need to compute gyi for
each ballot. At first glance, this is very expensive, taking
approximately n = 105 multiplications to compute gy1 .
However, note that gy2 = gy1  gx2  gx1 . More generally,
gyi = gyi 1  gxi  gxi 1 for i > 1. Thus, computing gyi , for
i = 2; 3; : : : ; n, incurs negligible cost.
For each ballot i, exponentiation is the predominant cost
factor. It takes one exponentiation to compute gxi , one
to compute gxiyi and four to compute the 1-out-2 ZKP
for each no/yes vote, totalling ten exponentiations. Each
exponentiation takes approximately 5 milliseconds on a
2.33-GHz MacBook laptop [13]. Therefore, pre-computing
all ballots on a single laptop takes 0:005  10  n = 5  103
seconds = 1.4 hours. (We have not factored in the use of
any form of optimization technique e.g. caching.)
In the ballot casting stage, the computational cost incurred
by the DRE machine is very small – the machine merely
needs to print out the pre-computed cryptogram according
to the voter’s choice. The main delay is most likely caused
by printing.
The ballot tallying involves multiplying n group elements
to obtain g
P
vi . One exponentiation requires an average of
1:5  log2 q = 240 multiplications. The multiplication will
take approximately n=240 0:005 = 2:08 seconds. Verifying
the tally against the count accounted for by the DRE requires
one additional exponentiation: that is, another 0.005 seconds.
In addition, before an election, anyone can verify that the
published random public keys gxi lie within the prime-order
group, and that the values of gyi are correctly computed. To
verify the ZKP for the published vote Vi, it is necessary to
first validate the order of Vi. This requires an exponentiation
(for both the valid and dummy cases); it takes a further four
exponentiations to verify the 1-out-of-2 ZKP (see [10], [11])
In total, it takes roughly 5 exponentiations (0.025 seconds)
to verify a ZKP on a laptop.
In summary, for the example of 100,000 votes, ballot
generation will take about 1.4 hours on a laptop. During
ballot casting, the computational cost only involves a digital
signing; the main delay will be the time it takes to print the
receipt. Finally, it takes approximately 2 seconds to verify
the tallying. The verification of the published ZKPs will be a
distributed effort, which takes 2,500 seconds in total. These
estimates suggest the feasibility of our system in practice.
Voter Privacy: As explained earlier, when a voter stands
in front of a touch-screen voting machine that records votes
directly, there is a fundamental difficulty in preserving the
secrecy of the vote. The machine can learn the secret
choice in several ways – for example, through the direct
interaction with the voter who touches the screen, or based
on the internal xi values or unused cryptograms. This is an
inherent drawback with any DRE system (when compared
with paper-based voting [7]).
Therefore, there is a technical limit in what we can
achieve, but still, there exist physical and procedural so-
lutions to address this issue. For example, as in the US
election, after authentication, the voter will obtain a random
token (i.e., a PIN slip or smart card) to cast a vote [24]. The
token does not identify the voter. Therefore, the voting is
effectively anonymous – hence protecting the voter’s privacy.
Denial of Service: The DRE-i protocol allows the public
to verify the integrity of the election result: whether or not
the integrity holds. For that, all electronic data published by
the DRE machine must be precise. Also, all votes must be
included within the tallying process. If a single vote goes
missing, the integrity check will fail (which by itself is
valuable information to the public as it indicates the count
announced by the DRE machine is no longer trustworthy.)
An attacker may be motivated to alter or delete electronic
data, hence discrediting the election. This is essentially a
Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Note that this is not any
weakness in the DRE-i protocol, as the protocol cannot
prevent an attacker from tampering with data. But any
tampering will be detected, which is what the protocol is
designed to achieve.
Nonetheless, the threat of the DoS attack needs to be
properly addressed in practice. This effectively demands that
DRE vendors must follow stringent engineering practice to
ensure hardware and software robustness (which is generally
required in most security-critical systems [3], e.g., payment
solutions in the banking industry).
More Powerful Coercion: We previously highlighted that
the DRE-i receipt is coercion free. However, there may be
more powerful coercion scenarios: e.g., threatening voters
not to vote at all, forcing voters to film everything they do
in the private booth, or colluding with the DRE machine to
discover the voters’ secret votes etc [22]. It is beyond our
protocol to address these threats. If such powerful coercion
becomes widespread, the value of the election itself may be
called into question.
Voter Enrollment and Authentication: Voter enrollment
and authentication are two important pre-conditions for our
protocol. The former helps to determine the volume of
ballots to generate. The latter is crucial to ensure one-man-
one-vote. The election staff at the polling station must keep
a reliable record of how many voters have voted on the
election day. This number can then be compared with the
total count of valid votes published on the public bulletin
board. It is possible, that once inside the booth, the voter
fails to cast a vote, or only casts dummy votes. This would
be evident by the paper receipt or the returned authentication
token.
Social Engineering Attacks: Typically, threats have cen-
tered on how to identify a misbehaving DRE machine,
however, past works rarely consider the case where the DRE
is honest, but the voter is misbehaving. We call this a “social
engineering attack”, as the attack is not technical in nature,
but can sometimes be very effective if countermeasures are
lacking. We highlight a few attacks and countermeasures
below. Note that the attacks are also applicable to other e-
voting protocols in general [1], [2], [9], [25].
As an example, suppose the voter selects “yes” in the
first step, and then chooses to cancel. The machine dutifully
prints a receipt to reveal the “yes” selection and declares
the vote as dummy. The voter may now report to the
election staff that he actually selected “no”. We assume the
purpose of this attack is to discredit the machine. In such
a situation, is the voter misbehaving or the machine? For
the election staff, it is not easy to tell the difference. If
the voter raises the dispute, one practical resolution is to
invite several independent observers to supervise the voting.
The independent observers do not need to learn the voter’s
secret. For example, the voter casts several dummy votes
under independent observation until being happy that the
machine is acting in accordance with his wishes.
In another example, the voter might dispute that he
chose “cancel”, but the screen displays “your vote has been
confirmed”. Again, there is no easy way to tell who is lying.
One resolution may be to have several voting officials jointly
agree to mark the ballot as “disputed” and allow the voter to
cast another vote. When the election finishes, the “disputed”
ballots, together with the unused ballots, will be revealed
by the DRE and declared “dummy”. (Essentially, this is
the same as allowing re-voting as in the UCL election [2].)
The key to resolution is to ensure that the handling of the
“disputed” votes is transparent to the public. In any event,
the total number of the valid votes published on the public
bulletin board shall match the number of the voters who
actually cast their votes on the election day.
Receipt Verification: The generated paper receipt provides
the voter the ability to verify whether his vote has been
correctly included in the final tally. The receipt itself does
not reveal any information about whom the voter has voted
for. Still, it is important for voters to verify the receipts, so
that DRE fraud, if any, can be detected. However, in general,
we should assume that many voters will not endeavour to
verify the receipts by themselves. This is a general problem
for many cryptographic e-voting protocols [2], [9], [25],
and not specific to our protocol. It is therefore crucial
for election officials to establish incentive schemes, that
encourage verification of receipts, and to provide voters with
all the necessary facilities and assistance to do so (say near
the exit of the polling station).
In fact, we have designed the protocol in such a way
that the voter does not have to understand cryptography in
order to verify the receipt. During the voting, if he opts to
“cancel” the vote, he only needs to verify that the revealed
candidate name on the receipt is the same as he chose in
the first step (see Figure 2); if not, he should immediately
raise a dispute. After voting, he merely needs to verify that
– possibly with the assistance of election officials near the
exit – the receipt is indeed published on the bulletin board.
He does not need to verify the receipt by himself. As long
as the same content is available on the public bulletin board,
anyone with the knowledge and skill can write a program
to verify the receipts in a batch.
In practice, there may be dedicated auditors from different
election parties. They can choose to audit the machine,
by casting dummy votes, at any time during the election.
They may even have the expertise to verify the receipts by
themselves. However, we should note that dedicated auditors
cannot replace the general public in auditing. For ordinary
voters, the ability to audit the system is important to build
public trust in the election.
Summary of Strengths and Weaknesses: To our best
knowledge, our protocol is the first centralized e-voting
system that is self-tallying. We summarize the strengths (+)
and weakness (-) of this new design below:
+ Thin client: The client does not need to execute any
downloaded code, therefore allowing use of a thin client
e.g. a plain browser that only displays HTML or an
ordinary mobile phone that only displays SMS.
+ Performance: During the election, casting a ballot in-
curs almost no delay; tallying ballots is rapid too.
Although this is at the expense of more preparation
before the election, the trade-off seems worthwhile.
+ Security: All the random values used in the encryp-
tions are chosen before the election in a controlled
environment with commitments published on the public
bulletin board. There is little room of manoeuvre by a
DRE once the machine is deployed in the field.
+ Self-tallying: By design, the election is self-tallying.
This greatly simplifies the tallying process; anyone can
compute the tally without tallying authority involve-
ment.
- Voter privacy: As the name suggests, the DRE-i pro-
tocol primarily addresses election integrity, not voter
privacy. But in any real-world election, it is important
to protect voter privacy. One solution is to decouple the
identity from the ballot, thereby enabling anonymity.
This is feasible to implement, through physical means,
at a polling station (e.g., in the US [24]). How-
ever, guaranteeing anonymity in Internet-based e-voting
seems very difficult. We aim to address this problem in
future research4.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents the DRE-i protocol as a means to
ensure tallying integrity in electronic voting. The protocol
makes use of a cancellation formula, combined with a pre-
computation strategy; it adds strong assurance of tallying
integrity to the DRE system, without altering the voter’s
intuitive voting experience; the auditing is voter-initiated,
and has been seamlessly integrated into the natural voting
process; the protocol is generically applicable to both on-
site and remote e-voting; the election is self-tallying, so
the public can tally the votes without relying on trusted
computing or tallying authorities; and though the protocol
primarily focuses on tallying integrity, we also described
procedural means to preserve voters privacy.
The integrity of an election underlies the integrity of
democracy. With the the DRE-i system, the cliché slogan
“every vote counts” may have a whole new meaning.
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